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1 Introduction
Motivated by well-established evidence that a decision maker (DM) does not consider all
feasible alternatives, various decision models under limited consideration have been proposed.
There, some feasible alternatives are a priori excluded from an agent’s consideration due to
the limitation of recognition capacity and/or due to the shortlisting according to some criteria
different from her preference (e.g., psychological restrictions, a preference on categories rather
than alternatives, and others). Each of those models is conceptually insightful and plausible,
and they have different interpretations and structures on a DM’s consideration, which could
in turn result in different empirical implications.
Given this, it is important to have a tool for testing each decision model based on observed
choice behavior of a DM. Following the pioneering work by De Clippel and Rozen (2018a), this
paper puts forward an empirical revealed preference theory of limited consideration models. As
a theoretical contribution, we establish revealed preference tests for several important decision
models that are not covered in the literature. Similar to De Clippel and Rozen’s setting, our
tests are based on a data set in the form of O “ tpat, AtqutPT , where T is the set of indices of
observations, and for each t P T , at is the chosen alternative from the set of feasible alternatives
At. In particular, it suffices to observe choices on some feasible sets, rather than an entire
choice function, and we do not require any information on a DM’s consideration. Applying
our revealed preference tests as well as existing ones, we provide the following two types of
data analyses. First, by simulation we numerically compare the relative strength of observable
restrictions across various models, and second, we carried out an experiment to compare the
models in terms of Selten’s index, which measures the plausibility of a model in explaining
data sets.
In general, a limited consideration model can be described as a pair of preference and
consideration mapping pą,Γq, of which the latter specifies a consideration set ΓpAq for each
feasible set A. Throughout this paper, we stick to the case of a DM’s preference ą being a strict
preference, i.e., ą is complete, asymmetric and transitive.1 The property of Γ varies across
models, and it in turn specifies the nature of a model. Amongst others, we look at limited
1There are some models in which a DM’s preference satisfies less properties (e.g., it only obeys asymmetry rather
than transitivity), and revealed preference tests for these cases are treated in De Clippel and Rozen (2018b). On the
other hand, as also referred to in Lleras, Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2017), the results from an eye-tracking
experiment by Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer and Rangel (2011) broadly supports the hypothesis of a strict preference.
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consideration models with Γ having the following structures that are shared by many decision
procedures. We say that a consideration mapping Γ is an attention filter (AF), if removal of
unrecognized alternatives does not affect the consideration set, namely, x P A and x R ΓpAq ùñ
ΓpAzxq “ ΓpAq. On the other hand, Γ is referred to as a competition filter (CF), if the set of
unrecognized alternatives is monotonic with respect to the set inclusion order of feasible sets,
i.e., x P A1 Ă A2 and x R ΓpA1q ùñ x R ΓpA2q. When Γ has both AF and CF structures,
then we refer to it as a competitive attention filter (CAF). The axiomatic characterizations of
a model with AF and that with CF/CAF are respectively given by Masatlioglu, Nakajima and
Ozbay (2012) and Lleras, Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2015, 2017) based on a choice
function of a DM.2 On the other hand, De Clippel and Rozen (2018a) provides a revealed
preference test for a model with AF based on limited data, and a similar test for a model with
CF is essentially shown by Dean, Kibris and Masatlioglu (2017).3 In this paper, as a follow-up
of these papers, we establish a revealed preference test a lá De Clippel and Rozen for a model
with CAF. Note that even if a data set passes both a test for AF and that for CF, it may not
be consistent with any model with CAF.
There are a number of real-world examples that generate CAF. If for example, a DM pays
attention to: (a) n-most advertised commodities; (b) all commodities of a specific brand,
and if there are none available, then all commodities of another specific brand; or (c) n-top
candidates in each field in job markets, then all of them derive CAF. More importantly, using
classical results in social choice theory, a CAF can be characterized in the following two ways,
both of which provide clear economic interpretations of testing a model with CAF:
(i) Suppose that a DM has multiple criteria tRiuiPI that compare alternatives and that
she only considers alternatives that are the best in terms of some Ri. If every Ri is
complete, asymmetric and transitive, then a DM’s consideration mapping is a CAF, and
conversely, every CAF can be represented as such. If each Ri is a general binary relation,
then the above procedure is equal to the rationalization model in Cherepanov, Feddersen
and Sandroni (2013), of which the consideration mapping is characterized by CF. Thus,
testing a model with CAF can be interpreted as testing whether a DM’s consideration is
formed by using criteria with order structure, while testing CF is equivalent to testing
2Lleras et al. (2015) is a working paper version of Lleras et al. (2017).
3Dean et al. (2017) provides a revealed preference test for a status-quo bias model where a DM’s consideration
is a CF that depends on a status-quo. It can be easily adjusted to our context. Note also that the first version of
De Clippel and Rozen (2018a) dates back to 2012, and, to the best of the authors knowledge, it is the first paper to
look at revealed preference analysis of limited consideration models with limited data.
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the rationalization model itself.
(ii) Suppose that a set of feasible alternatives A is represented as A “ A1 Y A2. In fact,
if (and only if) a DM’s consideration mapping Γ is a CAF, then it holds that ΓpAq “
ΓpΓpA1qYA2q “ ΓpA1YΓpA2qq, which is referred to as path independence (PI). Through an
inductive argument, as its name suggests, PI ensures that the formation of a consideration
set can be decomposed into an arbitrary path of the formations of consideration sets on
smaller feasible sets. Put otherwise, when a DM sequentially narrows down alternatives
like a tournament, the order of treatments does not affect the resulting consideration set.
Thus, testing a model with CAF can be interpreted as testing this type of robustness to
a sequential formation of a consideration set.
As an important special case of a limited consideration model with CF/CAF, we also pro-
vide revealed preference analysis on the following two-step decision procedure so called the
rational shortlisting method. There, a DM makes a shortlist of alternatives that are undomi-
nated in terms of some acyclic binary relation, and then maximize her preference within this
shortlist. The axiomatic characterization of this type of model is firstly given by Manzini and
Mariotti (2007) and an important variation, where the first step preference is asymmetric and
transitive, is studied by Au and Kawai (2011). For simplicity, we refer to a consideration
mapping derived from these models respectively as a rational shortlist (RS) and a transitive
rational shortlist (TRS). In fact, a (T)RS is a CF (CAF) obeying the additional axiom called
expansion (EX): for every A1 and A2, ΓpA1q X ΓpA2q Ă ΓpA1 Y A2q. Thus, our revealed pref-
erence test for a model with (T)RS can be interpreted as a test for a model with CF (CAF)
obeying EX.
Given tools for testing limited consideration models, we apply them to look at the empirical
aspects of models. Specifically, gathering together with existing tests, now we can test models
with AF, CF, CAF and (T)RS. It is obvious that limited consideration models are relatively
permissive compared to the rational choice model, and there are several subclass/superclass
relations within limited consideration models (e.g., CAF is obviously stronger than both of
AF and CF). Meanwhile, it is not at all clear how relatively restrictive/permissive the models
are. Following Bronars (1987), we generate random choices and apply our tests to see the
fraction of data that are consistent with each model. Provided that observable restriction
of each model depends on the structure of feasible sets, we repeat the above procedure over
randomly generated profiles of feasible sets. In our simulation, we stick to the environment
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with 20 feasible sets, each of which contains 2 – 8 alternatives out of 10 alternatives. Our
result shows that the strength of observable restriction is strikingly different across models. A
model with AF is very hard to reject with average pass rate of random data exceeding 99%,
and a model with CF is also permissive with average pass rate exceeding 60%. However, the
joint of them, or a model with CAF, is far more restrictive with average pass rate being less
than 4%. The rational shortlist models both have strong testing power: the average pass rate
of RS is less than 3% and that of TRS is less than 0.1%. In other words, while AF itself is
very hard to reject, imposing it on top of CF or RS could drastically strengthen observable
restrictions (note that an RS that also obeys AF property is a TRS). A similar argument
applies to imposing EX on top of CF or CAF, given that (T)RS is the conjunction of CF
(CAF) and EX.
Furthermore, based on an experimental data set, we compare models in terms of Selten’s
index, which is a measure for evaluating a model as an explanation of data. Given choice data of
subjects, Selten’s index of a model is practically calculated as the difference between pass rate
of the revealed preference test of actual data and that of randomly generated choices. Loosely
speaking, a model is highly evaluated if (i) it can well explain observed choices, while (ii) its
observable restriction is strong (see Selten (1991) and Beatty and Crawford (2011)). In our
baseline experiment, we adopted one profile of feasible sets generated in the simulation part,
i.e., each subject was asked to make choices on 20 feasible sets containing 2 – 8 alternatives
out of 10 alternatives. Amongst 113 subjects, 33% of them were consistent with the rational
choice model, about 60% were consistent with RS/TRS, and the pass rates for AF, CF and
CAF exceeded 90% (nobody failed AF test). On the other hand, in terms of Selten’s index,
CAF distinctively performed well. As a comparative experiment, we also collected choice
data with smaller feasible sets, where each subject was given 20 feasible sets containing 2 –
5 alternatives out of 10 alternatives. In this case, TRS achieved the highest value of Selten’s
index.
Organization of the paper: In Section 2, we briefly review limited consideration models
dealt with in this paper, as well as some characterization results known in the literature. The
theoretical heart of our paper lies in Section 3: we firstly provide a basic idea of our approach
in testing limited consideration models in Section 3.1, and then provide revealed preference
tests for a model with CAF and that with (T)RS respectively in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. In
Section 4, we apply our tests to simulation and experimental data. The substantial parts of
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proofs of main theorems are given in Appendix I. From a technical perspective, our revealed
preference tests have a similar mathematical structure, so called acyclic satisfiability, to the
test for a model with AF in De Clippel and Rozen (2018a). As rigorously shown in their
paper, this class of problems can be computationally challenging, and our tests also share
that computational issue. Nevertheless, features of the tests allow us to employ a computing
method called backtracking, which is an efficient search method in dealing with combinatorial
problems.4 We adopted this method in our testing algorithms, and actually applied them in
the simulation and experiment. The basic idea of backtracking and our algorithm is given in
Appendix II. The detail of experimental setting is summarized in Appendix III.
2 Limited consideration models
Consider a single-agent decision problem where X is a finite set of alternatives, and ą is
a complete, asymmetric and transitive preference of a DM, to which we refer as a strict
preference. If a DM obeys the rational choice model, then for every feasible set A P 2X , she
maximizes her strict preference on A. On the other hand, in limited consideration models,
either consciously or unconsciously, a DM makes a shortlist of alternatives, and then she
maximizes her preference on that shortlist. That is, there exists a consideration mapping
Γ : 2X Ñ 2X such that ΓpAq Ă A for every A P 2X , and a DM maximizes her strict preference
on ΓpAq, rather than A itself. Given a consideration mapping Γ, ΓpAq is referred to as a
consideration set on A, and, in what follows, we always assume that A ‰ H and ΓpAq ‰ H
for every A. We call a pair of strict preference and consideration mapping pą,Γq as a limited
consideration model.
While various types of Γ can be considered depending on its interpretation, we mainly
deal with consideration mappings obeying the following two properties. We say that Γ is an
attention filter (AF), if for every A P 2X and x P A,
x R ΓpAq ùñ ΓpAzxq “ ΓpAq. (1)
In words, Γ is an AF, if the consideration set is not affected when unrecognized alternatives
are removed from a feasible set. On the other hand, we say that Γ is a competition filter (CF),
4Classical textbook examples where backtracking is used are the eight queens puzzle, crossword puzzles and
sudoku.
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if for every A1 Ă A2 and x P A1,
x R ΓpA1q ùñ x R ΓpA2q. (2)
That is, when Γ is a CF, if an alternative is not recognized in a smaller feasible set, then it
cannot be recognized in a larger feasible set. When Γ satisfies both (1) and (2), then we say
that Γ is a competitive attention filter (CAF).5 When Γ is an AF, a limited consideration model
pą,Γq is referred to as an AF-model. Similarly, we say that pą,Γq is a CF-model (CAF-model),
when Γ is a CF (CAF).
It is known that CF and CAF can be characterized as a result of filtering by coarse criteria
tRiuiPI . Suppose that a DM has a family of binary relations tRiuiPI and that as candidates
for a choice, she picks up alternatives that are the best with respect to some Ri.6 Then, the
consideration set ΓpAq is represented as
ΓpAq “
ď
iPI
tx P A : xRiy for all y P Azxu. (3)
The following proposition says that such a consideration mapping Γ is a CF, and conversely,
any CF can be represented as (3) by using some family of binary relations tRiuiPI . In addition,
if each Ri is assumed to be complete, asymmetric and transitive, then such filtering behavior
characterizes a CAF. The former can be found, for example, in Lleras et al. (2017), while the
latter is shown by Aizerman and Malishevski (1981).
Proposition A. A consideration mapping Γ : 2X Ñ 2X is a CF, if and only if there exists
a set of binary relations tRiuiPI with which Γ is represented as (3) for every A P 2X . In
addition, Γ is a CAF, if and only if it is represented as (3) by using complete, asymmetric and
transitive binary relations tRiuiPI .
The preceding characterization motivates another important property of a CAF. Now,
suppose that a DM has a set of criteria tRiuiPI and some A P 2X is feasible. It seems natural in
5We realize that these notions are considered in many papers, with being referred to as different names. We
basically follow the terminologies in Masatlioglu et al. (2012) and Lleras et al. (2017). A survey by Moulin (1985)
contains many theoretical results concerning these restrictions. For example, the statements in Propositions A – C
below are essentially covered there.
6A decision theoretic analysis on such a two-step decision model, which is referred to as the rationalization model,
is established by Cherepanov et al. (2013). Manzini and Mariotti (2012) proposed another type of two-step decision
model called the categorize-then-choose model, which is known to be observationally equivalent to the rationalization
model, though these models are conceptually quite distinct.
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actual decision making that a DM makes a shortlist ΓpAq sequentially, rather than calculating it
at once. For instance, when A is divided into two parts, say, A1 and A2, a DM may firstly derive
ΓpA1q and then apply tRiuiPI to pΓpA1qYA2q. Thus, this procedure will yield ΓppΓpA1qYA2q,
while if a DM firstly looks atA2, then she will have ΓpA1YΓpA2qq. It is not difficult to check that
if every Ri is complete, asymmetric and transitive, then ΓpΓpA1qYA2q “ ΓpAq “ ΓpA1YΓpA2qq.
Thus, by Proposition A, if Γ is a CAF, then each ΓpAq is robust to sequential derivation as
above. Through an inductive argument, the robustness is valid even if a feasible set is divided
into more than two parts. Moreover, by Aizerman and Malishevski (1981), the above property
actually characterizes a CAF.
Proposition B. A consideration mapping Γ is a CAF, if and only if for every A1, A2 P 2X ,
ΓpA1 YA2q “ ΓpΓpA1q YA2q, which is referred to as path independence (PI).
As an important special case of the above argued decision models, we refer to the rational
shortlist method proposed by Manzini and Mariotti (2007). There, for each feasible set A P 2X ,
a consideration set is defined such that
ΓpAq “ tx P A : Ex1 P A such that x1 ą1 xu, (4)
for some binary relation ą1. That is, a DM only picks up undominated alternatives with
respect to her first step preference. In Manzini and Mariotti (2007), a first step preference
ą1 is just assumed to be acyclic, while Au and Kawai (2011) deals with the case where ą1 is
asymmetric and transitive.7 We say that Γ is a (transitive) rational shortlist, or in short, it is
a (T)RS, if it can be described as (4) by using an acyclic (asymmetric and transitive) binary
relation ą1. By abuse of terminology, we refer to pą,Γq as a (T)RS-model, if Γ is a (T)RS. It
is straightforward to check that RS is a special case of CF, and when ą1 is asymmetric and
transitive, which is a TRS, Γ defined in (4) is a CAF. Moreover, the following equivalence is
known by Sen (1971) and Schwartz (1976).8
Proposition C. A consideration mapping Γ : 2X Ñ 2X is a (T)RS, if and only if it is a CF
(CAF) and for every A1, A2 P 2X , ΓpA1qXΓpA2q Ă ΓpA1YA2q. The latter property is referred
7In Manzini and Mariotti (2007), they assumed that ą1 is just asymmetric. However, since they also assume that
the choice function is nonempty for all A P 2X , it is clear that ą1 must be acyclic (otherwise ΓpAq would be empty
for some A). Note also that, in their original setting, a DM’s preference ą is just asymmetric.
8By using it, one can confirm that amongst the examples (a) – (c) raised for CAF in Introduction, only (b) derives
a TRS.
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to the expansion axiom (EX).
3 Revealed preference tests
The purpose of this section is to provide a tool for testing each type of limited consideration
models stated in the preceding section. Our analysis is based on a data set in the form of
O “ tpat, AtqutPT , where T “ t1, 2, ..., T u is the set of indices of observations, At P 2X is the
feasible set at observation t, at P At is the chosen alternative at t P T , and As ‰ At is assumed
for every s ‰ t. Thus, for each observation point t P T , we observe a DM’s choice and a feasible
set, while a consideration set ΓpAtq is not observable. It should be stressed that following De
Clippel and Rozen (2018a), we allow the case where an econometrician can observe a DM’s
choice behavior only on some feasible sets, rather than observing an entire choice function.
Given a data set as above, we would like to find a pair of strict preference and consideration
mapping pą,Γq such that for each t P T , the observed choice at is the best alternative within
ΓpAtq and that Γ obeys a specific restriction introduced in the preceding section (AF, CF,
CAF and (T)RS).
Definition 1. A data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT is rationalizable by a limited consideration model
pą,Γq, if for every t P T , at P ΓpAtq and at ą x for every x P ΓpAtqzat. In particular,
if O is rationalizable by a P-model (P “ AF, CF, CAF, (T)RS), then we say that O is
P-rationalizable.9
Note that when we say that O is P-rationalizable, Γ is required to obey P on the entire
domain 2X , rather than on observed feasible sets. Obviously the relative strength of restrictions
on Γ determines the relative strength of testing power of them: for example, if a data set is TRS-
rationalizable, then it is also CAF-rationalizable, which in turn implies CF-rationalizability
and AF-rationalizability.
Amongst five types of restrictions raised in the preceding section, tests for AF-model and
CF-model are known in the literature: De Clippel and Rozen (2018a) established a test for
P “ AF, and a test for P “ CF can be easily derived from Theorem 5 in Dean et al. (2017).
The latter is proved in Appendix I.
9It is clear that any data set is rationalizable by some pą,Γq without any restriction on the shape of Γ. Indeed, we
could just let ΓpAtq “ tatu for every t P T , which does not work in general once some P (“ AF, CF, CAF, (T)RS)
is imposed.
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Theorem A. A data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT is AF-rationalizable, if and only if there exists an
acyclic binary relation ą˚ such that for every s, t P T with as, at P As XAt and as ‰ at,
Dx P AszAt such that as ą˚ x or Dx P AtzAs such that at ą˚ x. (5)
Theorem B. A data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT is CF-rationalizable, if and only if the following
binary relation ąCF is acyclic: for x2 ‰ x1,
x2 ąCF x1, if for some s, t P T , x2 “ as, x1 “ at and tx2, x1u Ă As Ă At. (6)
It may come as a surprise that tests for AF-model and CF-model have quite different
structures. The test for CF-model stated in Theorem B has a “conventional” form of revealed
preference tests in that it only requires testing acyclicity of a binary relation determined from
a data set. On the other hand, in Theorem A, we have to directly check the existence of
an acyclic binary relation with a specific property, to which De Clippel and Rozen (2018a)
refers as an acyclic satisfiability problem. As shown in that paper, a certain class of acyclic
satisfiability problems can be solved by using an efficient enumeration process, but Theorem A
is not such a type of problem. Moreover, De Clippel and Rozen (2018a) proves that checking
the condition in Theorem A is actually NP-hard.
In the rest of this section, we establish revealed preference tests for CAF-model and (T)RS-
model, which are not provided in the literature. As we later show in an example, even if
a data set simultaneously obeys the conditions in Theorems A and B, it may not be CAF-
rationalizable, and hence, the test for CAF-model must be independently considered. It should
be also noted that, as in Theorem A, revealed preference tests for these models are in the class
of acyclic satisfiability problems. In addition, our tests also involve combinatorial calculations
and applying them to actual data could be computationally challenging. Nevertheless, in
our application, the help of a simple but powerful method called backtracking made the tests
manageable including the test for AF-model based on Theorem A. See Appendix II for the
basic idea of backtracking and how that method is adopted to our revealed preference tests.
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3.1 A common starting point of tests
We start from a useful fact shared by all limited consideration models in this paper, and then
proceed to a test for each specific model based on it.10 Given a data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT ,
define the direct revealed preference relation ąR such that x2 ąR x1, if x2 “ at for some
t P T , x2 ‰ x1, and x1 P At. It is well known that a data set is consistent with the rational
choice model, if and only if ąR is acyclic, or the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP)
is satisfied. Put otherwise, if a data set O obeys SARP, then we can find a strict preference ą
such that pą,Γq rationalizes O with Γ being the identity mapping. Since the identity mapping
obeys all conditions concerning Γ referred to in this paper, our revealed preference tests become
substantial when O contains revealed preference cycles.
A revealed preference cycle is formally defined as a set of pairs C “ tpxk, xk`1quKk“1 with
xk ąR xk`1 for every k “ 1, 2, . . . ,K, and x1 “ xK`1. We refer to each pxk, xk`1q as an
arc of a cycle. Now suppose that O is rationalizable by some limited consideration model,
though it has revealed preference cycles. Then, since a DM has a strict preference ą, for each
cycle, there exists at least one arc pxk, xk`1q for which xk`1 ą xk. When there are Q revealed
preference cycles in total, from each q-th cycle, pick up one of those arcs cq to make a profile of
arcs D “ pc1, c2, ..., cQq P ˆ
Q
q“1Cq. Note that, since each ci is an ordered pair of components in
X, D can be also regarded as a set of ordered pairs, or a binary relation on X. We interpret D
as such whenever it is convenient. If a profile of arcs D is determined as above, it is effectively
a part of a DM’s strict preference ą in that px1, x2q P D implies x2 ą x1. Hence, D must be
acyclic if it is regarded as a binary relation, and it also implies a connection between the above
defined D and a DM’s consideration mapping Γ as follows. For each t P T , define
BtD “ tx P A
t : pat, xq P Du. (7)
Then, every x P BtD is available at A
t and preferred to at, which implies that x R ΓpAtq. Put
otherwise, ΓpAtq Ă AtzBtD holds for every t P T . We summarize the above observation as a
fact for future references.
Fact 1. Suppose that a data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT is rationalizable by some limited consider-
ation model and has Q revealed preference cycles. Then, there exists an acyclic selection of
10In fact, tests for AF-model and CF-model can be also constructed through the idea provided below, which can
be found in an earlier version of this paper, Inoue and Shirai (2018).
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arcs from cycles D “ pc1, c2, ..., cQq P ˆ
Q
q“1Cq such that ΓpAtq Ă AtzBtD for every t P T , where
BtD “ tx P A
t : pat, xq P Du.
Note that the above fact is derived without using any specific property P, and hence it
is shared by any limited consideration model. On the other hand, once P is specified, we
enhance the conclusion of Fact 1, which in turn derives a testable condition characterizing
P-rationalizability. This is exactly the strategy we take in the rest of this section.
3.2 Testing CAF-model
Here, we establish a revealed preference test for CAF-model. Suppose that a data set O with
Q revealed preference cycles is CAF-rationalizable. To derive a characterization, by using the
fact that Γ is a CAF, we strengthen Fact 1 step by step. In what follows, another expression of
the definition of an AF in (1) is useful: for every A,A1 P 2X , ΓpAq Ă A1 Ă A ùñ ΓpA1q “ ΓpAq.
Fact 2. Suppose that a data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT is CAF-rationalizable. Then, there exists an
acyclic selection of arcs from cycles D “ pc1, c2, ..., cQq P ˆ
Q
q“1Cq such that for every s, t P T ,
pAszBsDq Ă A
t ùñ ΓpAtq Ă AtzBsD. (8)
Proof. Take any D for which ΓpAtq Ă AtzBtD for every t P T , which exists by Fact 1. Note
that when pAszBsDq Ă A
t holds, we have ΓpAsq Ă AszBsD Ă pA
s XAtq Ă As. Then, since Γ is
AF, ΓpAsq “ ΓpAsXAtq must hold, which in turn implies that x P BsD ùñ x R ΓpA
sXAtq.
The above can be further extended as follows.
Fact 3. Suppose that a data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT is CAF-rationalizable. Then, there exists an
acyclic selection of arcs from cycles D “ pc1, c2, ..., cQq P ˆ
Q
q“1Cq such that for every r, s, t P T ,
rpAr YAsqzpBrD YB
s
Dqs Ă A
t ùñ ΓpAtq Ă AtzpBrD YB
s
Dq. (9)
Proof. Again, consider D obeying the property referred to in Fact 1. Then, both ΓpArq Ă
ArzBrD and ΓpA
sq Ă AszBsD hold. Since Γ is a CF, it holds that x P B
r
D ùñ x R ΓpA
r Y
Asq and x P BsD ùñ x R ΓpA
r Y Asq, which implies ΓpAr Y Asq Ă rpAr YAsqzpBrD YB
s
Dqs.
Since rpAr YAsqzpBrD YB
s
Dqs Ă A
t is assumed, we have rpArYAsqzpBrDYB
s
Dqs Ă rA
tXpArY
Asqs Ă pArYAsq. By the fact that Γ is an AF, it holds that ΓpAtXpArYAsqq “ ΓpArYAsq Ă
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rpAr YAsqzpBrD YB
s
Dqs. Finally, combining rA
tXpArYAsqs Ă At and Γ being a CF, we have
x P pBrD YB
s
Dq ùñ x R ΓpA
tq as desired.
By an inductive argument, ultimately we can extend (9) for any subset of indices τ Ă T
such that
`
Ť
rPτ A
r
H
Ť
rPτ B
r
D
˘
Ă At. That is:
Fact 4. Suppose that a data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT is CAF-rationalizable. Then, there exists
an acyclic selection of arcs from cycles D “ pc1, c2, ..., cQq P ˆ
Q
q“1Cq such that for every τ Ă T ,
˜
ď
rPτ
Ar
I
ď
rPτ
BrD
¸
Ă At ùñ ΓpAtq Ă Atz
ď
rPτ
BrD. (10)
The condition in Fact 4 depends on Γ, which is not observed by an econometrician, and
hence we cannot directly check the existence of D obeying (10) from a data set. Nevertheless,
we can convert it to a condition in terms of choices, which are observed in a data set. Indeed,
Fact 4 implies that, when O is CAF-rationalizable, there must exist an acyclic section of arcs
from cycles D such that
´
Ť
rPτ A
r
I
Ť
rPτ B
r
D
¯
Ă At ùñ at R
Ť
rPτ B
r
D. The right hand side
follows, since at P ΓpAtq must hold for every t P T .
CAF-condition: Suppose that a data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT contains Q revealed preference
cycles. A selection of arcs from cycles D “ pc1, c2, . . . , cQq P ˆ
Q
q“1Cq obeys CAF-condition, if
for every t P T and any set of indices τ Ă T ,
˜
ď
rPτ
Ar
I
ď
rPτ
BrD
¸
Ă At ùñ at R
ď
rPτ
BrD. (11)
The existence of a selection of arcs obeying the above can be checked once a data set is
given, and it is necessary for a data set to be CAF-rationalizable. More substantially, if we
can find such an acyclic selection of arcs, then a data set is CAF-rationalizable. That is,
CAF-rationalizability is tested by checking the existence of an acyclic selection of arcs from
cycles obeying CAF-condition.
Theorem 1. A data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT is CAF-rationalizable, if and only if there exists
an acyclic selection of arcs from cycles that obeys CAF-condition.
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Remark. While the conditions look quite different, there is some similarity between the test
for AF-model in Theorem A and the test for CAF-model in the preceding theorem. Namely,
in both theorems, the conditions require the existence of acyclic binary relations with specific
properties, that is, our test is also in the class of acyclic satisfiability. In addition, in both tests,
acyclic binary relations in issue correspond to “partial guesses” of a DM’s strict preference: in
the proof of Theorem A given by De Clippel and Rozen (2018a), a binary relation ą˚ works
as a part of DM’s preference relation, while, as argued in the preceding subsection, an acyclic
selection of arcs D can be interpreted as a profile of “false” revealed preferences.
Gathered together with Propositions A and B in Section 2, testing CAF-model is equivalent
to testing PI of DM’s consideration as well as testing a two-step decision model with complete,
asymmetric and transitive criteria.11
Corollary 1. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) A data set O has an acyclic selection of arcs from cycles obeying CAF-condition.
(ii) A data set O is CAF-rationalizable.
(iii) A data set O is rationalizable by pą,Γq with Γ obeying PI.
(iv) A data set O is rationalizable by pą,Γq with Γ being expressed as (3) for a family of
complete, asymmetric and transitive criteria tRiuiPI .
Finally, we point out that the joint of the test for AF-model (Theorem A) and that for CF-
model (Theorem B) does not work as a test for CAF-model. In the example below, a data set
is AF-rationalizable and CF-rationalizable. However, it does not contain any acyclic selection
of arcs from cycles obeying CAF-condition, or equivalently, it is not CAF-rationalizable.
Example 1. Let X “ tx1, x2, x3u and consider a data set of three observations as follows,
where for each t P T , the chosen alternative is underlined:
A1 “ tx1, x2u, A
2 “ tx1, x2, x3u, A
3 “ tx2, x3u.
This data set is AF-rationalizable and CF-rationalizable. To check the former, there are two
pairs of observations, namely ps, tq P tp1, 2q, p2, 3qu with as, at P As X At and as ‰ at. Then,
by letting x2 ą
˚ x1 and x2 ą
˚ x3, binary relation ą
˚ is acyclic and (5) is satisfied. For
11Recall that Γ : 2X Ñ 2X obeys path independence (PI) if for every A1, A2 P 2X , ΓpA1 YA2q “ ΓppΓpA1q YA2q.
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example, it holds that for ps, tq “ p1, 2q, x3 P A
2zA1 and a2 ą˚ x3. Thus, this data set is
AF-rationalizable. To see the latter, following (6) we have x1 ą
CF x2 and x3 ą
CF x2. Since
ąCF is acyclic, this data set is CF-rationalizable.
However, this data set is not CAF-rationalizable. This data set contains two revealed
preference cycles, namely C1 : x1 ąR x2 ąR x1; C2 : x2 ąR x3 ąR x2. We firstly claim that
any selection of arcs containing px1, x2q cannot satisfy CAF-condition. Let D be a selection
of arcs from cycles containing px1, x2q. Then, x2 P B
1
D, and hence A
1zB1D Ă A
2 and a2 “
x2 P B
1
D. This is a violation of (11), and hence such a selection D cannot satisfy CAF-
condition. Therefore, from C1, the arc px2, x1q must be selected. Then, consider a selection of
arcs D “ ppx2, x1q, px2, x3qq. This derives B
2
D “ tx1, x3u, and we have A
2zB2D “ tx2u Ă A
1
and a1 “ x1 P B
2
D, which is a violation of (11). Thus, from C2, the arc px3, x2q must be
selected, and D “ ppx2, x1q, px3, x2qq is only one remaining possibility. This selection derives
B3D “ tx2u and A
3zB3D “ tx3u Ă A
2. However, since a2 “ x2 P B
3
D, this D also violates
CAF-condition.
3.3 Testing (T)RS-model
Then, we turn to the case of (T)RS-model. Based on the nature of the model, we can extend
Fact 1 as follows. Suppose that O “ tpat, AtqutPT contains Q revealed preference cycles
and is (T)RS-rationalizable. Then, a DM has two preferences ą1 and ą, where the former is
acyclic (asymmetric and transitive) while the latter is a strict preference, and the consideration
mapping Γ is defined as (4). Then, Fact 1 implies that there exists an acyclic selection of arcs
from cycles D “ pc1, c2, . . . , cQq such that the corresponding tB
t
DutPT satisfies ΓpA
tq Ă AtzBtD
for every t P T . Since a DM obeys a (T)RS-model, for every x1 P BtD, there exists some
x2 P Atzx1 such that x2 ą1 x1. This in turn implies that x1 is not considered as long as x2 is
feasible, and hence, x1 ąR x2 is impossible.
Given the discussion above, we can define a binary relation Ź on X such that x2 Ź x1 if
x1 P BtD for some t P T , x2 P Atzx1, and x1 čR x2. Since we start from a data set consistent
with a (T)RS-model, for every x1 P BtD, there exists at least one x
2 P Atzx1 with x2 Ź x1 for
which x2 ą1 x1 actually holds. Loosely speaking, Ź can be seen as a broad guess of the first
step preference ą1. In addition, the acyclicity of ą1 requires that we can always find a selection
Ź1 Ă Ź that is acyclic, and for every t P T and x1 P BtD, there exists some x2 P Atzx1 with
x2Ź1 x1. Furthermore, if the first step preference ą1 is assumed to be transitive, a selection Ź1
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has to be chosen so that
for every x1 P BtD and z
1, ..., zk, x2 Ź1 z1 Ź1 ¨ ¨ ¨ Ź1 zk Ź1 x1 ùñ x1 čR x2. (12)
Now, Ź1 is a “correct” guess of the first step preference, and if transitivity is imposed, the above
implies that x2 ą1 x1. Hence, if x1 ąR x2 were to hold, then it leads to a contradiction that x1
is deleted from a consideration set from which it is actually chosen. In fact, this observation
is summarized in the conditions below, and plays a key role to characterize a data set that is
rationalizable by a (T)RS-model.
(T)RS-condition: Suppose that a data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT contains Q revealed preference
cycles. An acyclic selection of arcs from cycles D “ pc1, c2, . . . , cQq P ˆ
Q
q“1Cq obeys RS-
condition, if for the corresponding tBtDutPT , there exists an acyclic selection Ź
1 of Ź, where
for every t P T ,
for every x1 P BtD, there exists x
2 P At with x2 Ź1 x1. (13)
When Ź1 can be chosen so that (12) is also satisfied, we say that D obeys TRS-condition.
Theorem 2. A data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT is (T)RS-rationalizable, if and only if there exists
an acyclic selection of arcs from cycles obeying (T)RS-condition.
Remark. As seen from the statement, testing (T)RS-model is also in the class of acyclic
satisfiability. In De Clippel and Rozen (2018a), they showed that testing RS-model is NP-
hard, while they did not show a revealed preference test for that model. Note that, as argued
there, it is possible to show the computational complexity even if the condition is not exactly
specified.
Given Proposition C in Section 2, testing (T)RS-model is equivalent to testing the joint of
CF (CAF) and EX.12
Corollary 2. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) A data set O has an acyclic selection of arcs from cycles obeying (T)RS-condition.
12Recall that a consideration mapping Γ obeys the expansion axiom (EX), if for every A1, A2 P 2X , ΓpA1qXΓpA2q Ă
ΓpA1 YA2q.
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(ii) A data set O is (T)RS-rationalizable.
(iii) A data set O is rationalizable by pą,Γq with Γ being a CF (CAF) that obeys EX.
Finally, the following example shows that RS-model has a strictly stronger observable
restriction than CF-model. Similarly, one can construct an example that is CAF-rationalizable,
but not TRS-rationalizable.
Example 1. (continued) Reconsider the data set in the preceding subsection:
A1 “ tx1, x2u, A
2 “ tx1, x2, x3u, A
3 “ tx2, x3u,
where chosen alternatives are underlined. While this data set is CF-rationalizable, it is not RS-
rationalizable. We firstly claim that any selection of arcs containing px1, x2q or px3, x2q cannot
satisfy RS-condition. Whenever px1, x2q is contained in D, we have x2 P B
1
D. Meanwhile,
since there is no x P A1 such that x2 č
R x, it is impossible to define Ź so that x2 is dominated
by an alternative in A1, which violates (13). A parallel logic shows that px3, x2q cannot be an
arc selected from C2. Hence D “ ppx2, x1q, px2, x3qq is the only remaining possibility. However,
in this case, B2D “ tx1, x3u, and thus x1 Ź x3 and x3 Ź x1 hold, and there does not exist an
acyclic selection of Ź that obeys (13).
4 Simulation and Experiment
Given the theorems in the preceding section, now we can test AF, CF, CAF and (T)RS-models
from a data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT . In this section, we apply the tests for these models both to
randomly generated data sets and experimental data sets in order to deal with the following
two issues: one is to compare relative strength of observable restrictions across models based
on randomly generated data sets, and the other is to compare the measure of “plausibility”
across models based on experimental data sets.
The former can be regarded as a version of Bronars’ test in the context of limited con-
sideration models, and one can measure the strength of observable restriction of each model
by using its pass rate.13 If we collect a sufficiently large number of random choices according
to a uniform distribution, then the pass rate approximates the proportion of choices that are
13Bronars (1987) deals with the revealed preference test of the classical consumer theory. There, the fail rate of
GARP on randomly generated data sets on randomly generated budgets is calculated.
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model-consistent to all logically possible choices. If this value is very close to 1, then the model
in question is very hard to refute, or its observable restriction is weak.
As shown by Selten (1991) and Beatty and Crawford (2011), this measure of observable
restriction plays a key role in considering the measure of plausibility of a model based on
empirical or experimental data sets, which is nothing but our second issue in this section.
Given empirical or experimental data sets, Selten’s index evaluates a model by the difference
of the pass rate calculated from actual data sets and the proportion of model-consistent choices
to all logically possible choices. Practically, as in Beatty and Crawford (2011), Selten’s index
is calculated as the difference between pass rate based on actual data and that of randomly
generated data sets. We could say that a model with a higher Selten’s index is “better” than
that with a lower Selten’s index, or intuitively, a “nice” model in terms of Selten’s index is a
model with higher pass rate and stronger observable restrictions.14
4.1 Simulation
We generated 10,000 random data sets with |X| “ 10, |T | “ 20,min |At| “ 2, and max |At| “ 8.
Firstly, we randomly generated 100 profiles of feasible sets An :“ tAtnutPT for n “ 1, . . . , 100:
fixing n, in generating each Atn, we set |A
t
n| P t2, . . . , 8u following a uniform distribution over
the set of natural numbers t2, . . . , 8u, and then choose |Atn| elements fromX following a uniform
distribution over X. We also require that Asn ‰ A
t
n for s ‰ t. For each profile of feasible sets
An “ tAtnutPT , a profile of choices tati,nutPT is randomly generated for i “ 1, . . . , 100: fixing n
and i, ati,n is chosen following a uniform distribution over A
t
n for every t P T . Consequently
we have a random choice data set Oi,n “ tpati,n, AtnqutPT for i “ 1, . . . , 100, to which we apply
our revealed preference tests. Note that we randomize feasible sets, as well as choices over
them, since in general, observable restriction of a specific model depends on the structure of
the feasible sets An “ tAtnutPT . For example, if As X At “ H for every s, t P T , then SARP
is trivially satisfied, which implies that all five limited consideration models are non-refutable.
For each Oi,n “ tpati,n, AtnqutPT , we tested AF, CF, CAF and (T)RS-models, as well as SARP.
14Selten’s index has an axiomatization as follows. Let mpα, βq P r´1, 1s be a measure of plausibility of a model
that depends on the empirical pass rate, say, α P p0, 1q, and the proportion of model-consistent choices to all logically
possible choices, say, β P p0, 1q. Then, any mp¨, ¨q obeying the following axioms is an affine transformation of
Selten’s index α´β: [Monotonicity] mp1, 0q ą mp0, 1q, [Equivalence] mp1, 1q “ mp0, 0q, and [Aggregability]
mpλα1 ` p1´ λqα2, λβ1 ` p1´ λqβ2q “ λmpα1, β1q ` p1´ λqmpα2, β2q. The first and second axioms determine how
a measure should deal with extreme realizations of α and β, and the third axiom essentially implies that mp¨, ¨q is a
cardinal measure.
18
test pass rates
SARP 0
AF 0.9927
CF 0.6298
CAF 0.0396
RS 0.0259
TRS 0.0006
Table 1: Average pass rates.
In Table 1, the average pass rates of 100 different profiles of feasible sets (10,000 data
sets) are summarized.15 It shows that AF-model is extremely permissive, letting more than
99% of the random data sets pass the test, and CF-model is also quite permissive. On the
other hand, we can say that observable restrictions of CAF and (T)RS-models are reasonably
strong. What is striking is that, while more than 60% of all data sets pass both tests for
AF-model and CF-model, the pass rate of CAF-model is significantly lower (lower than 4%).16
Similarly, the difference between RS and TRS is also huge, where TRS is the conjunction
of RS and AF by Proposition C. Thus, although the hypothesis of Γ being an AF is very
hard to reject by itself, combining it with some other restrictions could strengthen observable
restrictions drastically. As another viewpoint, if we interpret Γ as a result of filtering by some
criteria tRiuiPI , by Proposition A, the difference between CF and CAF-models comes from
the additional assumption that every Ri is complete, asymmetric and transitive in the latter.
Similarly, by Proposition C, the difference between CF (CAF) and RS (TRS) is explained by
whether Γ obeys EX or not.
Finally, in Figure 1, we visually summarize the distributions of pass rates for each test,
where the horizontal axis is the pass rate given the profile of feasible sets, running from 0 to
1 with bin width 0.05. The vertical axis is the frequency of profiles of feasible sets of which
the pass rates drop in each bin. It shows that the pass rate for the test for CF-model has a
large variance depending on the structure of feasible sets, while pass rates for other models
15In Table 1, the pass rate of SARP is zero. While in theory there exist choice patterns consistent with it, there
were none within our samples.
16Randomly generated data sets can be partitioned into eight types: (i) TRS-rationalizable; (ii) RS-rationalizable
and CAF-rationalizable but not TRS-rationalizable; (iii) RS-rationalizable but not CAF-rationalizable; (iv) CAF-
rationalizable but not RS-rationalizable; (v) both CF-rationalizable and AF-rationalizable but neither CAF nor
RS-rationalizable; (vi) only CF-rationalizable; (vii) only AF-rationalizable; (viii) none of these types. Out of 10,000
data sets, the distribution of types is as follows: (i) 24 data sets, (ii) 4 data sets, (iii) 186 data sets, (iv) 369 data
sets, (v) 5575 data sets, (vi) 140 data sets, (vii) 3576 data sets and (viii) 126 data sets.
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Figure 1: Histograms.
are more accumulated around either 0 or 1.
4.2 Experiment
We now proceed to the second issue of this section, or the comparison of Selten’s indices
based on experimental data sets. Amongst the profiles of feasible sets tAnu100n“1 generated for
simulation, we chose one of them: one where the pass rates of the five limited consideration
models are fairly “balanced.” In choosing one profile of feasible sets, we first listed several
of them where (i) pass rate of the test for AF-model is not 1 and (ii) pass rates of the tests
for most models were distinct. Then for each of these profiles, we generated 1000 random
choices, in order to assess the pass rates of each model in further detail. Finally, we picked one
profile of feasible sets where pass rates of all five models were distinct, pass rate of the test for
AF-model is not 1, and that of TRS-model is not 0.
Following the experimental design of Manzini and Mariotti (2009), we consider the situation
where each subject chooses remuneration plans of installments.17 Each remuneration plan
consists of 2400 Japanese yen overall, and this amount is split and installed in one month,
17Note that Manzini and Mariotti (2009) is the working paper version of Manzini and Mariotti (2012).
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
in 1 month 450 800 1150 450 450 800 850 1200 1550 500
in 3 months 800 800 800 450 1500 1150 0 0 0 0
in 5 months 1150 800 450 1500 450 450 1550 1200 850 1900
Table 2: The remuneration plans (in Japanese yen).
three months, and five months after the experiment is conducted. Since the profile of feasible
sets is one of those used in simulation, there are 10 alternatives and 20 feasible sets in total,
and each feasible set consists of 2 – 8 alternatives (see Appendix III for the contents of each
feasible set). These numbers are not known to subjects. Most of the ten alternatives are in
line with the eight alternatives used in Manzini and Mariotti (2009): there are “increasing,”
“constant,” “decreasing” and “jump” series of payments and we added two “hump” payments
in order to make the total number of alternatives ten. The alternatives are listed in Table 2:
alternatives x1 and x7 are “increasing,” x2 and x8 are “constant,” x3 and x9 are “decreasing,”
x4 and x10 are “jump,” and x5 and x6 are “hump” series.
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The pass rate for each model is in the left column of Table 3. Statistical differences
between the pass rates are significant at SARP & TRS (at 1% significance level); AF & CF
(5%); AF & CAF (1%); and CAF & RS (1%) in terms of a two-sample t-test assuming
equal variance. The center column indicates random pass rates of models; to derive them, we
generated 500,000 random choices over the feasible sets. Then, Selten’s index of each model
is derived as the difference between pass rates of experimental data and randomly generated
data: for example Selten’s index of CAF-model is 0.8832 “ 0.9115´ 0.0283. Looking at Table
3, for this experimental setting, CAF-model distinctively well-performs in terms of Selten’s
index, while its pass rate is not significantly different from CF-model.19
18The experiment was carried out at an experimental economics laboratory at the Faculty of Political Science and
Economics, Waseda University, Japan. We ran 4 sessions and there were a total of 113 subjects. Subjects were
recruited through an on-line bulletin that is accessible by all students. The proportion of male and female subjects
were roughly the same. The experiment was computerized using the experimental software z-Tree by Fischbacher
(2007), and each participant was seated individually with a separator so that they cannot look at other participants’
choices. Experimental sessions lasted an average of 42 minutes, of which the average duration of effective play was
11 minutes. The shortest session lasted 36 minutes and the longest 51 minutes. At the beginning of the experiment,
subjects read instructions on paper, while the experimenter read the instructions aloud (see Appendix III for an
English translated version of the instructions). Preceding the remuneration-relevant stages, subjects were asked
to take part in practice stages in order to be familiar with the usage of the computer in the experiment, and all
subjects had to correctly answer questions that were asked to check whether the subjects understood the experimental
design. It was explained that at the end of the experiment, one screen would be selected at random, and the chosen
remuneration plan at that screen would be actually installed.
19Concerning the random pass rate of SARP, similar to the case of Table 1, in theory there exist choices that are
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experiment pass rates random pass rates Selten’s index
SARP 0.3363 0.0000 0.3363
AF 1.0000 0.9639 0.0361
CF 0.9558 0.4714 0.4844
CAF 0.9115 0.0283 0.8832
RS 0.5929 0.0157 0.5772
TRS 0.5841 0.0012 0.5829
Table 3: Experimental pass rates, random pass rates, and Selten’s indices.
Remark. Concerning the experimental pass rates, we also test whether there are statistical
differences between pass rates of subjects when we partition them with respect to decision
time, sex and reason of decision, using a two-sample t-test allowing different variances. There
is no statistical difference between long-decision-time subjects and short-decision-time sub-
jects; no statistical difference between male and female.20 In a questionnaire following the
experiment, we showed the subjects three experiment screens with their actual chosen alter-
natives indicated, and asked reasons of their choices. There are two clusters of subjects whose
answers were consistent across these three decisions: one is a cluster of subjects who wanted
to receive money “as soon as possible (a.s.a.p)” (29 subjects), and the other is a cluster of
subjects who would like to receive money “as equally as possible through the three install-
ments (smoothing)” (15 subjects). One may suspect these subjects tend to be more rational,
but there are no statistical differences between these 44 subjects and the others; the “a.s.a.p.”
subjects and the others; the “smoothing” subjects and the others; or the “a.s.a.p.” subjects
and the “smoothing” subjects.
We finally refer to the result of a comparative experiment, in which the cardinality of
feasible sets varies from 2 to 5. The set of alternatives is the same as the baseline setting, and
the number of feasible sets is also the same as before. The purpose of this experiment is to see
how the size of feasible sets affects the comparison in terms of Selten’s index. Similar to the
case of the baseline setting, we fix 20 feasible sets so that pass rates of five models are distinct,
and pass rate of the test for AF-model is not 1 and that of TRS is not 0. This experiment
was carried out at the same facility with the baseline experiment, and there were a total of 80
subjects in 3 sessions.21
The experimental pass rates, random pass rates, and Selten’s indices are summarized in
consistent with SARP, but there were none within the 500,000 randomly generated choices.
20A long-decision-time (short-decision-time) subject is a subject whose average decision time across 20 decisions
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experiment pass rates random pass rates Selten’s index
SARP 0.3875 0.0000 0.3875
AF 1.0000 0.9718 0.0282
CF 0.9375 0.7987 0.1388
CAF 0.9125 0.3674 0.5451
RS 0.6250 0.2038 0.4212
TRS 0.6125 0.0623 0.5502
Table 4: Result of the comparative experiment.
Table 4. Comparing the experimental pass rates of Tables 3 and 4, it seems that the pass
rates of relatively rational models, namely RS, TRS and SARP, are slightly higher in the
comparative setting, where subjects choose from smaller feasible sets. However, there was no
statistical significance in the difference of pass rates of each model across the two experiments.
On the other hand, random pass rates are quite different across the two experiments, and
hence Selten’s indices differ as well. In this comparative experiment, we see that TRS-model
explains subjects’ behavior the best, and the explanatory power of CAF is not as high as in the
baseline experiment, due to the fact that the random pass rate is higher in this comparative
experiment. This shows that the explanatory power of models may vary drastically in different
environments, even when the observed pass rates are similar.
Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Theorem B
Let ą˚ be a linear extension of ąCF, and define Γ such that
ΓpAq “
«˜
ď
t:AtĄA
tatu
¸
XA
ff
Y tx P A : y ą˚ x for all y P Azxu. (14)
Then ΓpAq ‰ H for every nonempty A P 2X , and at P ΓpAtq for all t P T . Moreover, by
definition of ąCF, at is the best alternative in ΓpAtq in terms of ą˚. The remaining issue is
whether the above defined Γ is a CF, which can be confirmed as follows. Let x̄ P A1 Ă A2,
is longer (shorter) than the median of all subjects.
21The recruitment procedure of subjects is also same with the baseline experiment, and no subject in this com-
parative experiment participated in the baseline experiment, and vice versa.
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and let x̄ P ΓpA2q. If x̄ P tx P A2 : y ą˚ x for all y P A2zxu, then x̄ is the worst alternative
(w.r.t. ą˚) in a larger set A2, and hence it must be also the worst alternative in A1. If
x̄ P
“`
Ť
t:AtĄA2ta
tu
˘
XA2
‰
, then it is obvious that x̄ P
“`
Ť
t:AtĄA1ta
tu
˘
XA1
‰
also holds. In
both cases, it holds that x̄ P ΓpA1q, which implies that Γ is a CF.
Proof of Theorem 1
We construct a pair of consideration mapping and strict preference that rationalizes O based
on an acyclic selection of arcs from cycles D (and the corresponding tBtDutPT ) obeying CAF-
condition. To define Γ, we need the following set of indices for every A P 2X :
τpAq “ max
#
τ Ă T :
ď
rPτ
Ar
I
ď
rPτ
BrD Ă A
+
. (15)
Then, by using τpAq, define Γ such that
ΓpAq “ A
I
ď
rPτpAq
BrD. (16)
Obviously, in order for the above definition to be well-defined, τpAq must be uniquely deter-
mined for every A P 2X , which is actually the case. To see this, suppose to the contrary:
there exist τ1pAq ‰ τ2pAq that obey (15). Then, we have
´
Ť
rPτ1pAq
Arz
Ť
rPτ1pAq
BrD
¯
Ă
A and
´
Ť
rPτ2pAq
Arz
Ť
rPτ2pAq
BrD
¯
Ă A, which implies that
»
–
ď
rPτ1pAqYτ2pAq
Ar
I
¨
˝
ď
rPτ1pAq
BrD Y
ď
rPτ2pAq
BrD
˛
‚
fi
fl Ă A.
Obviously, this can be rewritten as
¨
˝
ď
rPτ1pAqYτ2pAq
Ar
I
ď
rPτ1pAqYτ2pAq
BrD
˛
‚Ă A.
By defining τpAq “ τ1pAq Y τ2pAq, we have τpAq Ľ τipAq for i “ 1, 2, which contradicts the
maximality of τ1pAq and τ2pAq.
Given that Γ defined as (16) is well-defined, we move on to show that Γ is both AF and
CF. Consider any A1, A2 P 2X with A1 Ă A2, and x P A1 such that x R ΓpA1q. This means that
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x P
Ť
rPτpA1qB
r
D. Since τp¨q is clearly monotonic, it follows that τpA
1q Ă τpA2q, and hence,
x P
Ť
rPτpA2qB
r
D. This assures that x R ΓpA
2q, which shows that Γ is CF. To see AF, take any
A P 2X and any x P A with x R ΓpAq. This means that x P
Ť
rPτpAqB
r
D, which in turn implies
¨
˝
ď
rPτpAq
Ar
I
ď
rPτpAq
BrD
˛
‚Ă Azx. (17)
The maximality and uniqueness of τp¨q, combined with (17), imply τpAq Ă τpAzxq. On the
other hand, the monotonicity of τp¨q implies τpAzxq Ă τpAq. Hence we have τpAq “ τpAzxq.
Then, ΓpAzxq “ pAzxqz
Ť
rPτpAzxqB
r
D “ Az
Ť
rPτpAqB
r
D “ ΓpAq, which shows that Γ is AF.
Let ą˚ be a binary relation such that x2 ą˚ x1, if x2 “ at, x1 P ΓpAtq, and x2 ‰ x1. We
show that ą˚ is acyclic, and thus extendable to a strict preference. By way of contradiction,
suppose that there exists a cycle x1 ą˚ x2 ą˚ ¨ ¨ ¨ ą˚ xL ą˚ x1, which clearly implies x1 ąR
x2 ąR ¨ ¨ ¨ ąR xL ąR x1. Then, there exists an arc px`, x``1q contained in D. Since x` “ at
and x``1 P At hold for some t P T , this means that x``1 P BtD for such an observation t. It
is easy to check from the definition of Γ that t P τpAtq, and hence, x``1 R ΓpAtq Ă AtzBtD.
However, then, it holds that x` č˚ x``1, which is a contradiction.
Finally, let us show that at P ΓpAtq for every t P T , which follows immediately from
CAF-condition. Indeed, for every t P T , we have
´
Ť
rPτpAtqA
r
H
Ť
rPτpAtqB
r
D
¯
Ă At, and then,
CAF-condition requires at R
Ť
rPτpAtqB
r
D, which in turn ensures a
t P ΓpAq for every t P T .
Since ą˚ is acyclic, it is extendable to a strict preference ą on X using Szpilrajn’s theorem.
Then this ą and Γ defined as (16) combined together is a CAF-model that rationalizes O.
Proof of Theorem 2
The proofs for RS-model and TRS-model are almost identical, so we provide the proofs of them
jointly. Since the necessity parts of them have been already discussed, we prove the sufficiency
parts of them based on an acyclic selection of arcs from cycles obeying (T)RS-condition. Using
an acyclic selection Ź1 of Ź, define Γ as
ΓpAq “ tx P A : Ex1 P A such that x1 Ź1 xu. (18)
Note that the selection Ź1 is acyclic, so we use it as a first step preference for RS-model. If we
can find Ź1 so that it obeys (12) in addition to (13), then we use the transitive closure of it,
25
say, Ź2 as a first step preference and define Γ by using it instead of Ź1. This Ź2 works as a
first step preference for TRS-model. Note further that ΓpAtq Ă AtzBtD holds, by the definition
of Ź1 (or Ź2) and the construction of Γ. The remaining substantial parts of the proof are
to show that at P ΓpAtq for every t P T , and the binary relation ą˚ defined as x2 ą˚ x1 if
x2 “ at, x1 P ΓpAtq, and x2 ‰ x1 is acyclic.
To prove that ą˚ is acyclic, suppose to the contrary, i.e., there is a cycle: x1 ą˚ x2 ą˚
¨ ¨ ¨ ą˚ xL ą˚ x1. Since we have ą˚ĂąR, this cycle implies x1 ąR x2 ąR ¨ ¨ ¨ ąR xL ąR x1.
Then, it must be the case that there exists an arc px`, x``1q contained in D, and we have
x``1 P BtD for every t P T with x` “ at and x``1 P At. By (T)RS-condition, there exists some
x P At such that x Ź1 pŹ2qx``1, which in turn implies x``1 R ΓpAtq. Then it is impossible to
have x` “ at ą˚ x``1, and we conclude that ą˚ is acyclic.
To see that at P ΓpAtq for every t P T , by way of contradiction, suppose that for some
t P T , at R ΓpAtq. This means that there exists x P Atzat such that x Ź1 at, which in turn
implies x Ź at. However, this is not possible, since x Ź at requires at čR x, while we have
at ąR x. When D obeys TRS-condition and Γ is defined as the set of maximal elements with
respect to Ź2, at R ΓpAtq implies the existence of some x P Atzat such that xŹ2 at. However,
this is also impossible, since xŹ2 at implies the existence of a sequence z1, z2, ..., zk such that
xŹ1 z1Ź1 ¨ ¨ ¨Ź1 zkŹ1at, and by TRS-condition, at čR x, which contradicts the assumption that
x P At. The rest of the proof is to extend the transitive closure of ą˚ to a strict preference
by using Szpilrajn’s theorem. Then it can easily be seen that the data set is rationalized by a
(T)RS-model pą,Γq.
Appendix II: Backtracking
The revealed preference tests for CAF-model and (T)RS-model involve combinatorial calcu-
lations, and applying them to actual data may be computationally challenging. However, the
tests become manageable with the help of a simple but powerful method called backtracking.22
Here we illustrate how this method is adopted to our revealed preference tests, after a brief
introduction of this method. Note that the method here is also applicable to Theorem A by De
Clippel and Rozen (2018a), and we actually employ the algorithm here in our data analysis.
22Some foundational references of the backtracking method are Walker (1960), Davis, Logemann and Loveland
(1962), and Golomb and Baumert (1965).
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To get the basic idea of backtracking, consider a problem where we have to select cq from
some set Cq for every q “ 1, 2, ..., Q, so that the resulting selection pc1, c2, . . . , cQq obeys some
constraint PQ. While there are
śQ
q“1 |Cq| logically possible trials that we must check, the
backtracking procedure may lead us to a solution with much fewer trials, especially when PQ
has the cut-off property defined below. For every sQ ă Q, let us refer to pc1, c2, . . . , c sQq as a
partial selection in the sense that cq is not yet determined for q P t sQ ` 1, . . . , Qu. Then, we
say that PQ has the cut-off property if: (I) for every sQ ă Q, there exists a constraint P sQ,
which is a length- sQ-modified version of PQ; and (II) partial selection pc
1
1, c
1
2, . . . , c
1
sQ
q violating
P
sQ implies violation of P sQ`1 for any partial selection pc
1
1, c
1
2, . . . , c
1
sQ
, c
sQ`1q. Given the cut-
off property, if some partial selection pc11, c
1
2, . . . , c
1
sQ
q violates P
sQ, then there is no need to
waste time on searching for subsequent components c
sQ`1, . . . , cQ, since there is no chance of
any selection pc11, c
1
2, . . . , c
1
sQ
, c
sQ`1, . . . , cQq satisfying PQ. In fact, this feature is at the heart of
backtracking, and allows us to adopt a component-by-component search for a desired selection.
Given below is a basic algorithm of the backtracking method. We consider a case where Cq
is finite for every q, so with no loss of generality, we assume that sets Cq are a sets of integers.
Basic backtracking algorithm. Given sets pCqqQq“1 and constraints pPqq
Q
q“1, this algorithm
yields a selection pc1, c2, . . . , cQq that satisfies PQ, orH (meaning that PQ cannot be satisfied).
1. [Initialize.] Set sQÐ 0.
2. [Enter level sQ`1.] (Now pc1, . . . , c sQq obeys P sQ.) Set
sQÐ sQ`1. Then set c
sQ Ð min C sQ.
3. [Test pc1, . . . , c sQq.] If pc1, . . . , c sQq obeys P sQ, go to 6.
4. [Try again.] If c
sQ ‰ max C sQ, set c sQ to the next larger element of C sQ, and go to 3.
5. [Backtrack.] Set c
sQ Ð min C sQ and sQÐ sQ´ 1. If sQ “ 0, return H and stop. Otherwise,
go to 4.
6. [Terminate.] If sQ “ Q, return pc1, . . . , c sQq and stop. Otherwise, go to 2.
The big picture of this algorithm is as follows. The process initially starts from considering
a singleton selection pc1q and sees whether P1 is satisfied. If there is no such element in C1,
then we can immediately conclude that there is no chance of finding a selection pc1, c2, . . . , cQq
obeying PQ. If we find a successful partial selection pc1, c2, . . . , c sQ´1q and reach the
sQ-th level,
we set c
sQ to be the minimum element in C sQ, and test whether pc1, c2, . . . , c sQq obeys P sQ. If
P
sQ is satisfied, then we proceed to the p
sQ` 1q-th level. If not, we redefine c
sQ to be the next
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larger element of C
sQ and check P sQ. If we cannot find any c sQ P C sQ such that pc1, c2, . . . , c sQq
obeys P
sQ, then we go back to the p
sQ ´ 1q-th level and update c
sQ´1. This search algorithm
terminates when we succeed in finding some pc1, c2, . . . , cQq obeying PQ, or it is determined
that any (partial) selection with c1 “ maxC1 cannot be successful.
We now show that the backtracking method is applicable to our revealed preference tests
as follows. Suppose that a data set O “ tpat, AtqutPT has Q revealed preference cycles.
For each q “ 1, 2, ..., Q, let Cq be the q-th revealed preference cycle. Then, for every P P
tCAF, RS, TRSu, if we set PQ as the joint of acyclicity and P-condition, the revealed prefer-
ence test for P-model is equivalent to the existence problem of a selection of arcs from cycles
D “ pc1, c2, ..., cQq obeying constraint PQ. We claim that the above defined PQ obeys the
cut-off property for every P P tCAF, RS, TRSu.
Condition (I): We define P
sQ for every
sQ ď Q as follows. Given a partial selection of arcs
DQ̄ “ pc1, c2, . . . , c sQq, note that D sQ can be regarded as a binary relation. Therefore, acyclicity
is a well-defined constraint. Now we define a partial sequence version of P-condition, to which
we refer as P
sQ-condition as follows. Similar to (7), we can define for every t P T ,
Bt
sQ “ tx P A
t : pat, xq P D
sQu. (19)
We say that a partial selection of arcs from cycles D
sQ “ pc1, c2, ..., c sQq obeys P sQ-condition,
if the corresponding tBt
sQ
utPT satisfies the restriction in P-condition; specifically, D sQ obeys
CAF
sQ-condition, if it holds that for every t P T and any set of indices τ Ă T ,
˜
ď
rPτ
Ar
H
ď
rPτ
Br
sQ
¸
Ă At ùñ at R
ď
rPτ
Br
sQ. (20)
Similar terminology is used for other models as well. With this P
sQ-condition, we let P sQ be
the joint of acyclicity and P
sQ-condition, which is clearly a well-defined constraint.
Condition (II): We show that if a partial selection of arcs from cycles D
sQ “ pc1, c2, ..., c sQq
does not satisfy P
sQ for some
sQ ă Q, then D
sQ`1 “ pc1, c2, ..., c sQ, c sQ`1q cannot satisfy P sQ`1
for any c
sQ`1 P C sQ`1. It is obvious, if D sQ is cyclic, then D sQ`1 cannot be acyclic. Therefore,
the substantial part is P
sQ-condition. However, this follows straightforwardly by taking a look
at our revealed preference conditions and the construction of Bt-sets, which is shown below.
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Fact 5. If a partial selection of arcs from cycles D
sQ “ pc1, c2, ..., c sQq fails P sQ-condition, then
partial selection of arcs from cycles D
sQ`1 “ pc1, c2, ..., c sQ, c sQ`1q fails P sQ`1-condition.
Proof. Note that the selection of arcs from cycles 1, 2, . . . , sQ are the same in D
sQ and D sQ`1.
Hence, it follows from (19) that Bt
sQ
Ă Bt
sQ`1
for every t P T . By the structure of P
sQ-condition
and P
sQ`1-condition, we can see the following: whenever we have “larger” B
t-sets, (i) the LHS
of CAF-condition is more permissive and (ii) Ź is stronger and thus more difficult to find an
acyclic (asymmetric and transitive) selection of it in (T)RS-condition. Both (i) and (ii) imply
that D
sQ`1 fails P sQ`1-condition whenever D sQ fails P sQ-condition.
Example 2. Let X “ tx1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6u and consider a data set of six observations as
follows, where for each t P T , the chosen alternative is underlined:
A1 “ tx1, x2, x4u, A
2 “ tx1, x2u, A
3 “ tx3, x4, x6u,
A4 “ tx3, x4u, A
5 “ tx2, x5, x6u, A
6 “ tx5, x6u.
Let us walk through the backtracking algorithm, and see how we determine that the data set is
not rationalizable by an RS-model. Note that the data set has four cycles (we order the cycles
and the arcs in them as below):
1. C1 “ tpx1, x2q, px2, x1qu,
2. C2 “ tpx3, x4q, px4, x3qu,
3. C3 “ tpx5, x6q, px6, x5qu,
4. C4 “ tpx1, x4q, px4, x3q, px3, x6q, px6, x5q, px5, x2q, px2, x1qu.
For every sQ P t1, 2, 3, 4u, let us denote by P
sQ the joint of acyclicity and RS sQ-condition.
Following our backtracking procedure, we first set sQ “ 1 and set c1 “ px1, x2q, which is the
first arc of the first cycle. Since single element selection ppx1, x2qq obeys P1, we proceed to the
second cycle by setting sQ “ 2. Here we set c2 “ px3, x4q and check whether ppx1, x2q, px3, x4qq
obeys P2, which is affirmative. Then we go to the third cycle by setting sQ “ 3 and set
c3 “ px5, x6q. In fact, this partial selection of arcs from cycles ppx1, x2q, px3, x4q, px5, x6qq fails
to satisfy P3, specifically RS3-condition. In this case, we keep sQ “ 3, and update c3 to the
next arc in C3, and set c3 “ px6, x5q. Then, we test whether this updated selection of arcs
ppx1, x2q, px3, x4q, px6, x5qq obeys P3, which is negative. At this point, we can determine that
it is impossible to find a selection pc1, c2, c3, c4q obeying RS-condition and acyclicity as long as
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sQ (partial) selection P
sQ
1 ppx1, x2qq PASS
2 ppx1, x2q, px3, x4qq PASS
3 ppx1, x2q, px3, x4q, px5, x6qq FAIL
3 ppx1, x2q, px3, x4q, px6, x5qq FAIL
2 ppx1, x2q, px4, x3qq FAIL
1 ppx2, x1qq FAIL
0 H STOP
Table 5: Backtracking procedure applied to Example 2 for testing RS-model.
px1, x2q, px3, x4q are selected from C1, C2 respectively. Thus we backtrack sQ to 2, and update
c2 to px4, x3q. Looking at ppx1, x2q, px4, x3qq, it fails P2. Since there is no chance of success
unless px1, x2q is discarded from the selection, we rewind sQ to 1, and update c1 to px2, x1q.
Then we check whether ppx2, x1qq obeys P1, which is negative. Then sQ is set to 0 and the
algorithm terminates, which means that the data set is not rationalizable by RS-model.
Remark 1: One advantage of the backtracking approach is that we may be able to determine,
at an early stage of the process of search, that a data set fails the test. Due to this feature,
calculation time does depend on how we order the cycles. We suggest that the cycles are
sorted so that shorter cycles come first: whenever q1 ă q2, q1-th cycle is weakly shorter than
q2-th cycle. The cycles in Example 2 are sorted in this way. Whenever this takes too much
calculation time, it seems natural to list “problematic” cycles first. Problematic cycles are
those such that a (partial) selection of arcs from cycles fails when adding an arc at that
cycle. This may allow us to determine that a data set fails the test at an early stage of the
backtracking process (and we actually adopt this type of strategy).
Remark 2: Backtracking can be applied to De Clippel and Rozen (2018a)’s AF-test as well.
Recall that their test requires the existence of an acyclic binary relation ą˚ such that, for
every s, t P T , with as, at P As XAt and as ‰ at,
Dx P AszAt : as ą˚ x or Dx P AtzAs : at ą˚ x.
Suppose there are Q ą 0 pairs of observations ps, tq such that as, at P As XAt and as ‰ at. It
can be seen that backtracking is applicable to De Clippel and Rozen’s test, by letting PQ be
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acyclicity, and for q-th pair ps, tq, defining
Cq “
 
px2, x1q : rx2 “ as and x1 P AszAts or rx2 “ at and x1 P AtzAss
(
.
Appendix III: Experimental setting
Here we provide the following materials regarding the experiment: (i) the structure of feasible
sets used in our baseline and comparative experiment, (ii) an example of a computer screen
used in the experiment, and (iii) an English translated version of the experimental instructions.
In the tables of feasible sets below, alternative xi corresponds to the i-th remuneration plan
in Table 4. Note that in the actual experiment, the order of feasible sets was randomized as
well as the order of alternatives on the screen, so as to avoid framing effects. Tables 6 and 7
are lists of the twenty feasible sets that we used in the baseline and comparative experiments
respectively. The rows correspond to indices of observation t P t1, 2, . . . , 20u and columns
correspond to alternatives: the pi, jq-th entry is 1 if and only if xj P A
i.
Figure 2 is an example of a computer screen used in the experiment. This feasible set
consists of four alternatives, and the subject chooses an alternative by clicking the “Choose
this” button corresponding to it. Once this button is clicked, the subject has to confirm her
choice, in order to minimize the possibility of errors. The last three pages of this appendix are
allocated to an English translated version of the instructions used in our experiment.
Figure 2: An example of PC screen.
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
4 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
7 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
9 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
10 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
11 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
12 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
13 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
14 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
15 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
16 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
17 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
18 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
19 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
20 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 6: Feasible sets of baseline experiment.
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
3 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
7 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
8 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
10 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
11 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
13 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
14 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
15 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
16 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
17 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
18 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
19 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
20 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
Table 7: Feasible sets of comparative experiment.
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 1 
Instructions 
 
NOTE: You are not allowed to communicate with others during the experiment. 
       You are not allowed to use your mobile phone or any other personal electronic device. 
 
 Everyone is given the same instruction. This experiment is conducted to study individual 
decision-making behavior. This project is funded by KAKENHI (Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science).  
 
１．Outline of the experiment 
 In the experiment, you will repeatedly face some question screens. Each question screen 
will display several alternatives regarding “how to split and receive 2400 JPY in 1 month, 3 
months, and 5 months after the experiment.” While the amount of money you receive in 1 
month, 3 months, and 5 months respectively differs depending on which alternative you 
choose, the total amount of payment is 2400 JPY for every alternative. At each question screen, 
you are asked to choose the alternative that you prefer most.  
 
 
２．Example of experiment question screen 
 In order to get an idea of how alternatives will appear in the experiment, we show below 
some examples. In the actual experiment, the overall amount of money you receive is 2400 
JPY, but in this hypothetical example the total amount is fixed to 1000 JPY. The example 
screens are shown in page 3. 
 
Figure PC screen (a) displays two alternatives: the left and right alternative. In the left 
alternative, 100 JPY will be installed in 1 month, 300 JPY in 3 months, and 600 JPY in 5 
months, and in the right alternative, 900 JPY will be installed in 1 month and 100 JPY will be 
installed in 5 months. If you prefer the left alternative, click the “Choose this” button on the 
left. If you prefer the right alternative, click the “Choose this” button on the right.  
 2 
 
Figure PC screen (b) displays four alternatives. In this screen, the “Choose this” button of 
the second from the right alternative (250 JPY will be installed in 1 month, 300 JPY in 3 
months, and 450 JPY in 5 months) is clicked. If you want to confirm this choice, then click 
the “Confirm” button that appears on the bottom left of the screen. You can re-select other 
alternatives until this “Confirm” button is clicked.  
 
 
3．About payment method 
 In the experiment, you will be repeatedly asked to choose an alternative from question 
screens as in page 3. At the end of the experiment, one of the question screens will be chosen 
at random. Then according to the alternative that you chose at that question screen, 2400 JPY 
will be split and installed in 1 month, 3 months, and 5 months after the experiment. The 
payments will be installed by Waseda University, to the bank account that you registered to 
the university.  
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100 JPY in 1 month  
300 JPY in 3 months 
600 JPY in 5 months 
Choose this 
900 JPY in 1 month 
 
100 JPY in 5 months 
Choose this 
PC screen (a) 
450 JPY in 1 month 
300 JPY in 3 months 
250 JPY in 5 months 
Choose this 
400 JPY in 1 month 
 
600 JPY in 5 months 
Choose this 
PC screen (b) 
250 JPY in 1 month 
300 JPY in 3 months 
450 JPY in 5 months 
Choose this 
800 JPY in 1 month 
 
200 JPY in 5 months 
Choose this 
Confirm 
References
[1] Aizerman, M. and A. Malishevski (1981): General theory of best variants choice: some
aspects. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 26(5), 1030-1040.
[2] Au, P.H. and K. Kawai (2011): Sequentially rationalizable choice with transitive rationales.
Games and Economic Behavior, 73, 608-614.
[3] Beatty, T.K.M. and I. Crawford (2011): How demanding is the revealed preference ap-
proach to demand? American Economic Review, 101, 2782-2795.
[4] Bronars, S.G. (1987): The power of nonparametric tests of preference maximization. Econo-
metrica, 55, 693-698.
[5] Cherepanov, V., T. Feddersen and A. Sandroni (2013): Rationalization. Theoretical Eco-
nomics, 8, 775-800.
[6] Davis, M., G. Logemann and D. Loveland (1962): A machine program for theorem proving.
Communications of the ACM, 5, 394-397.
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